Sources
Source register
Footnote numbers throughout the scenario refer to the entries below. These sources ground the present-day starting conditions — the declared risks of frontier AI, the software-centric military, the strategic-stability literature — not the three speculative futures, which are causal propositions rather than reported fact. External links are identified as such; where a publisher blocks automated access the citation is marked pending a human check, and no URL is invented. Factual claims carry a July 2026 evidence cut-off.
[1]
The Bletchley Declaration (AI Safety Summit, 1–2 November 2023)
UK Government and 28 signatory states · 2023
Signatory states recognise 'potential for serious, even catastrophic, harm' from frontier general-purpose AI, including intentional misuse and problems of control.
[2]
International AI Safety Report
Independent expert panel (chaired by Yoshua Bengio); commissioned at the AI Safety Summits · 2025
Synthesis of evidence on general-purpose AI capabilities and risks. Site blocks automated access; citation pending a final human check.
https://internationalaisafetyreport.org/ (external link)
[3]
The Strategic Defence Review 2025
UK Government · 2025
Commits the UK to uncrewed systems at scale and machine-speed targeting integration — the military substrate this scenario couples general intelligence to.
[4]
Defining Autonomy: Why Software, Not Drones, Will Decide the Next War
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) · 2026
The locus of lethal decision-making is software and integration layers — the channel through which greater general capability would flow into force.
https://www.csis.org/analysis/defining-autonomy-why-software-not-drones-will-decide-next-war (external link)
[5]
Technological Evolution on the Battlefield
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) · 2025
Documents ~30-second detection-to-destruction cycles and rapid autonomy adoption in Ukraine.
https://www.csis.org/analysis/chapter-9-technological-evolution-battlefield (external link)
[6]
The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Strategic Stability and Nuclear Risk, Volume I
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) · 2019
How AI in early warning, command and control interacts with escalation and nuclear risk — the core mechanism of this site's crisis chapters.
[7]
Autonomous Weapon Systems and International Humanitarian Law — position paper
International Committee of the Red Cross · 2025–2026
The prohibitions-and-constraints approach the Concord scenario extends to general-purpose systems.
https://www.icrc.org/sites/default/files/2026-03/4896_002_Autonomous_Weapons_Systems_-_IHL-ICRC.pdf (external link)
[8]
Summary of NATO's revised Artificial Intelligence strategy
NATO · 2024
Existing alliance principles — lawfulness, accountability, traceability, governability — that Concord's institutions harden into verification.
[9]
IAEA safeguards and verification
International Atomic Energy Agency
The declarations-plus-inspections model Concord adapts to compute and coupling. Publisher blocks automated access; pending human check.
https://www.iaea.org/topics/safeguards-and-verification (external link)
[10]
Arms and Influence
Thomas C. Schelling (Yale University Press) · 1966
The classic account of compellence — using threatened force to demand action, not merely to deter it. The theoretical spine of the ransom mechanism. Book citation; no URL.
⚠ Exact source URL and independent corroboration required before publication.
[11]
Reporting on Soviet-era 'Perimeter' semi-automated nuclear retaliation architecture
Multiple secondary accounts (e.g. Hoffman, 'The Dead Hand', 2009) · 1985–2009
Reported historical precedent for automating elements of strategic retaliation. Cited as reported practice with contested details; stable citation to be chosen at publication.
⚠ Exact source URL and independent corroboration required before publication.